climate risks would be an area for Palestinian-Israeli cooperation were to be disappointed. Both leaders acknowledged that significant climate change impacts were forecast by the end of this century for the Eastern Mediterranean region: these impacts, Fayyad noted, included decreased participation, significant warming, a tendency towards more extreme weather events, and a rise in sea-level. 2 There was also a shared recognition that the key hazards posed by these changes-greater water scarcity, falling agricultural productivity, an increased probability of flashfloods and saline intrusion into groundwater-will be accentuated by a growing regional population.
There the commonality of concerns ended. "Carbon molecules carry no passport," stated Peres, 3 as he invited Israel's neighbours-including the PA-onto a regional environmental taskforce to tackle climate change. Rejecting this offer, the But while climate change is not the most pressing issue for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the climate risks are significant and will compound the current hazards posed by the Israeli occupation. As confirmed by recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) consultations on climate adaptation in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), 5 the impacts of climate change on the livelihoods of most Palestinians pale in comparison with the effects of the Israeli occupation. 6 The "climate vulnerability" approach employed in this article is a direct attempt to reconcile this tension between immediate living conditions and "external" climate impacts. It thus adds to the understanding of the effects of the occupation, as well as challenging those viewssuch as the Israeli position at COP15-that claim it is possible to separate environmental issues from politics. We argue that the expected effects of climate change are likely to compound the negative effects of the occupation, primarily through impairing existing coping mechanisms or forcing new ones. We also discuss how the discourse around climate change affects not only Palestinian living conditions and livelihoods but also state-building efforts.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND VULNERABILITY
In climate research, vulnerability is taken to mean the propensity of people or systems to be harmed by hazards or stresses, and is determined by "their exposures to hazard [s] , their sensitivity to the exposures, and their capacities to resist, cope with, exploit, recover from and adapt to the effects." 7 There is a claim that climate change is altering exposures to climate-related hazards, understood as extreme weather events (e.g.
flooding, extreme heat, droughts) which may trigger various societal shocks (e.g. falls in
food productivity or population displacements). What the IPCC labels "key"
vulnerabilities to climate change-those meriting policy attention as symptomatic of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system-are seen to depend on the magnitude, timing and distribution of climate impacts. 8 While early IPCC formulations favored biophysical framings of climate impacts and ecosystem vulnerability, it is now recognized that vulnerability to climate change properly extends to the socio-economic and political conditions that affect how communities cope with the impacts of climaterelated hazards. This has led to a more integrated understanding of vulnerability, which is designed to capture the role of non-climatic pressures on individuals and groups who are also facing climate hazards. 9 This broader perspective is in line with the definition adopted here, where climate vulnerability refers to the exposure to climate-related hazards in the context of social vulnerability, as well as in relation to response capabilities in both the short-term (coping with the effects) and long-term (adapting to the effects). We claim that, as is the case in many other contexts, climate vulnerability is less about changes in physical systems than the political-economic contexts in which "climate risk" is constructed and produced. 10 The substantive discussion below reports on climate vulnerability as the perceived risks Mediterranean are forecast by Israeli scientists to rise by 10cm every decade, which is consistent with global estimates of a 0.6-1.6m increase by the end of the century. 15 There is some scientific research claiming already to have identified warming and increasing aridity in Israel and the oPt. 16 However, regional climate model simulations have failed to reflect significant environmental variations within the oPt, even though these were used to generate the climate impact forecasts employed in the UNDP consultations on Palestinian climate vulnerability. 17 Secondly, the UNDP construction of climate vulnerability in the oPt highlighted climate risks as a humanitarian threat, placing them within the policy realm of disaster risk management and emergency response operations. Current high levels of food and water insecurity in Gaza and the West Bank are forecast to be exacerbated by climate change, on account of worsening food growing conditions (the agricultural sector consumes over two-thirds of water abstracted or flowing from springs in the oPt) and a fragile water supply infrastructure. 18 Combining population growth forecasts and regional climate change projections, it has been estimated that the oPt will experience a water deficit of 271 million cubic meters a year by 2020. 19 Given limited institutional capacity for disaster risk reduction in the PA, representing climate vulnerability as a humanitarian concern sustains the "emergency imaginary" of chronic human insecurity in the oPt-one that reproduces the dependence of the population on substantial flows of international assistance and, at the same time, the interventions of external actors. 20 Indeed, there is increasing interest from donors in financing climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in the oPt: the donor lead on climate change taken by UNDP is significant here as the agency serves as one of the main conduits for bilateral and multilateral aid allocated to Gaza and the West Bank.
Thirdly, UNDP's commitment to capacity-building for the PA has also reinforced a technical-managerial framing of climate vulnerability. Developing Palestinian administrative capacity for climate risk management has become another opportunity to inculcate "good governance" norms into the PA supportive of the Quartet agenda; that is, the existence of a Palestinian national authority co-existing peacefully with Israel while embracing democratic governance and market liberalism. 21 by Israeli settlements, while over a third of arable land in Gaza is effectively not accessible to farmers because it falls within IDF-declared "no-go" and "high-risk" zones adjoining the border. 23 Similarly, the terms and procedures of the "Oslo II" Agreement effectively prevent bulk water imports of clean water into the Gaza Strip and the full development of irrigation in the West Bank. The discussion below sets out the trajectories of climate vulnerability mapped out at meetings in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as the coping strategies currently employed by Palestinians to address existing shortfalls in water and food availability.
VULNERABILITY PATHWAYS AND COPING STRATEGIES IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK

Vulnerability pathways in the Gaza Strip
The UNDP climate change consultations conducted in Gaza in 2008/9 revealed a strong consensus among participants that its inhabitants as a whole have high climate vulnerability, though some communities are particularly exposed to climate-related hazards;
e.g. residents of Jabalya and Khan Younis, due to recent storm water overflows, and residents of inland low lands, including neighbourhoods of Gaza City. 24 This view reflects the exposure of the population to multiple biophysical hazards and, despite a wide array of coping mechanisms, its low capacity to adapt over the long-term to the The effects of worsening water quality reach even further. Israeli and Palestinian over-pumping of the coastal aquifer has been occurring for decades. The "sustainable limit" of the Coastal Aquifer has been estimated at 350 MCM/y, of which the Gazan portion is roughly 55 MCM/y. 29 Total pumping within the Gaza Strip in 2008 is estimated from roughly 100-170 MCM/y. 30 Not accounting for return flows, this means that the Gazan portion of the aquifer is already being over-drawn two to three times its sustainable limit. With the additional water stresses predicted from climate change and rapid population growth, the existing need for alternative water sources (e.g. significant transfers from southern Israel and/or a major desalination plant in Gaza) becomes even more pressing.
Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip already suffer the effects of severe water quality issues, the scale of which is difficult to exaggerate. 31 Due primarily to its permeable and sandy cover, the transboundary coastal aquifer supplying groundwater to the Gaza Strip has a significant "intrinsic vulnerability" to pollution. 32 Projected climate change-induced reductions in precipitation would exacerbate groundwater salinity levels through reduced soil flushing and groundwater recharge, while reductions in air moisture increase the soil water requirement of crops. Additional saline contamination of groundwater is expected with projected sea-level rise, compounding "natural" sources of salinization.
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Community and household coping mechanisms in Gaza
A number of coping mechanisms have been developed by the residents of Gaza in response to climate vulnerability. In some cases, these mechanisms are impaired by the Israeli occupation: other coping mechanisms are less by choice than imposed by extreme conditions of life. In the most extreme cases, coping mechanisms develop and, as with the smuggling under the border with Egypt, ingenuity can be perceived as criminal activity. Whether impaired or enforced, these coping mechanisms carry their own risks, and may serve to perpetuate climate vulnerability.
An example of impaired coping comes from the wastewater dilemma-to send it to the sea, or to let it percolate into the groundwater. Under more "normal" conditions, the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) would carry out an emergency upgrade to the Beit Lahiya wastewater treatment plant, while sending the sewage temporarily into the sea in order to avoid a grave public health risk. As both these options have been closed down by the Israeli blockade, the resource managers "cope" by shoring up the bank of the reservoir, thereby protecting the residents living on the edge, but letting the sewage contaminate the freshwater aquifer.
The development of private-sector water treatment plants exemplifies an "enforced" coping mechanism. In Gaza the increasingly poor drinking water quality has led to increased purchase of desalinated water from neighborhood-level reverse osmosis vendors, or the purchase of under-the-sink water filtration units. Both coping mechanisms contribute to the ever-greater share of household income spent on basic services, at least for those who can afford the option. 34 The quality of the water sold by the neighborhood vendors is not regulated and never tested. Contamination is very likely either at the source (because of poor maintenance) or during transportation (contaminants entering the jerry-cans and buckets used to transport the water). Even the water produced by the household filtration units remains biologically contaminated for lack of proper maintenance. The PWA and CMWU have responded in turn by mixing sources of safe and unsafe water to increase drinking water availability at a marginally safer quality level. By notifying the residents when it supplies safe water (from a less polluted source) and when it supplies unsafe water-which may still safely be used for washing-the overall coping ability of the community is increased. But the resilience of such enforced coping mechanisms in the long-term is, at best, precarious.
While other coping mechanisms are more benign, their contribution to long-term adaptive capacity may not be. Coping with the water crisis in the agricultural sector is becoming evident through the selection of less water-intensive and more salt-resistant crops, such as dates. This practice is in fact a return to tradition, as water-intensive citrus production originated from the period of Israeli settlement in Gaza. Similarly, the lack of stock fertilizers on the market has led to farmers rediscovering organic methods (as well as the use of partially-treated wastewater). The piloting of solar food-drying techniques has resulted from shortages in cooking gas. 35 Yet if the worst-case climate change scenarios were to develop, with increased crop water requirements and decreased water quality and availability, such "benign" coping mechanisms may prove insufficient to sustain farming livelihoods. With that threshold breached, a new set of vulnerabilities may have to be faced, such as prospects for alternative livelihoods in an economy prevented from trading with the world.
Vulnerability pathways in the West Bank
As in the case of Gaza, living conditions and livelihoods in the West Bank are impacted by both the biophysical and political-economic co-production of climate vulnerability-specifically risks associated with decreased (and more variable) precipitation and risks associated with various aspects of the Israeli occupation. Given its large utilization of available water resources and importance as the key source of rural livelihoods, agriculture is again the sector most sensitive to climate variability and change, particularly in the Governorates of Jenin and Tulkarem, and along the Jordan River
Valley. This sensitivity is heightened by a reliance on rain-fed agriculture-94% of (nonsettlement) arable agricultural land (166,000 ha) is ran-fed, with about two-thirds of this taken up by fruit trees (olives, citrus, grapes) and field crops accounting for most of the rest. While olive and some citrus trees are relatively resilient (and can tolerate several drier-than-usual seasons), yields of wheat and fodder crops are very sensitive to rainfall. . 37 The terms of this agreement also prevent any Palestinian drilling from the preferred aquifer basin (in terms of quality, quantity, and abstraction costs), and subjects drilling plans in the other basins to Israeli approval through the Joint Water Committee. 38 With groundwater resources in the West Bank abstracted at or beyond their sustainable limits, regional projections for climate change-induced precipitation decline and warming will, if accurate, exacerbate water quantity and quality stresses. Recent
Palestinian research forecasts significant falls in aquifer recharge volumes and increased water salinization as a result of climate change, though with significant uncertainty attached. 39 The stakeholder consultations on climate vulnerability undertaken by UNDP in the West Bank revealed agreement on reduced rainfall as the most important climate risk to rural livelihoods. This is shown on the right-hand side of Figure 2 by the various negative effects of reduced precipitation on groundwater supply and agricultural yields.
Apart from reduced aquifer recharge rates, decreased rainfall is projected to lead to lower soil moisture, lower supply of water from Israel, less spring flow, and increased groundwater salinization. The lower agricultural yields associated with these changes are forecast to impact negatively on agricultural livelihoods, either directly through reduced incomes or indirectly though an expected loss of land ownership from leaving fields unplanted for three years (a Israeli land appropriation practice, enabled by an Ottomanera law, discriminately applied in the West Bank). Less water retained in the soil will result in lower pasture production, forcing farmers and herders to purchase (more) fodder. Secondly, reduced rainfall will result in a lower quantity of water harvested and stored in cisterns, impacting negatively on agricultural productivity. The altered growing season further puts crops (and yields) at risk, as seeds sown generally in the autumn in anticipation of late November rains risk spoiling if the rains are delayed to January. Governorate have turned to breeding small ruminants breeding to cope economically.
Herd sizes have increased significantly in the past ten years, increasing human pressures on climate-stressed rangeland, triggering a vicious cycle of overgrazing and land degradation.
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In the northern govenorate of Tubas, which is economically dependent on agriculture, repeated drought periods have reduced springflow, limiting the time farmers have for irrigating their crops, and for producing second or third yearly harvests. As in the south of the Hebron Governorate, half the population of the Tubas Governorate is not connected to the Palestinian water network, making them dependent on rainwater harvesting, cisterns and tankers. Israeli movement restrictions block access to agricultural land for several villages in the region (e.g. around Al-Bikai'a). As with other Palestinian villages in Area C, these controls also mean that rural communities typically pay higher prices and suffer poorer water quality than would otherwise be the case. 
CONCLUSION
The idea that Palestinians are vulnerable to climate change is largely the product of a donor agenda, which fused international concern over "dangerous" climate change with the emergency imaginary of chronic human insecurity in the oPt. Both the environmental and humanitarian discourses deployed here are authoritative: from climate modelling applied to the Eastern Mediterranean, climate scientists concur that projected warming is highly likely to cause hazardous biophysical impacts across the region, including Gaza and the West Bank; and unequivocal evidence on current food and water scarcity in the oPt provides (further) support for those who speak of a Palestinian humanitarian crisis. It is not surprising that agricultural livelihoods feature at the convergence of these two discourses, as the agricultural sector consumes two-thirds of withdrawn water in the oPt and is sensitive to significant shifts in temperature and precipitation. Thus, the UNDP climate adaptation initiative for the PA focused on foodand water-related stresses in its construction of climate vulnerability pathways for Gaza and the West Bank.
For the UNDP, climate vulnerability was gauged by gathering "stakeholder" input on scientifically-derived climate projections, with a view to informing, and legitimizing, climate adaptation policy proposals for the PA. Developing climate governance capacity therefore became part of a state-building process anticipating a "post-conflict" future in which the PA assumes sovereign control of some Palestinian territory in Gaza and the West Bank. As noted above, this technical-managerial framing was disrupted by the insistence of stakeholders in Gaza and the West Bank that the Israeli occupation is constitutive of the vulnerability of Palestinians to climate risk.
Whether for security or settlement purposes, Israeli appropriation and degradation of environmental resources in the oPt is by far the most immediate, as well as enduring, threat to Palestinian living conditions and livelihoods. The UNDP climate consultations also highlighted how Israeli military and security practices significantly weaken the capacity of Palestinians to cope with, and adapt to, climate risks.
Contrary to technical-managerial representations, climate change impacts in the oPt are inherently politicized, and it makes little sense to develop "post-conflict" climate impact assessments or governance institutions for the Palestinians without an end to the occupation. Indeed, some claim that the existing conflict could be exacerbated by climate change as asymmetries in per capita water between the oPt and Israel are accentuated. 
